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BANISHMENT FROM WITHIN AND WITHOUT:
ANALYZING INDIGENOUS SENTENCING UNDER
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS
COLIN MILLER
I. INTRODUCTION
Centuries of imperialism and forced assimilation have pushed indige-
nous cultures to the brink of extinction. An important part of this cultural
genocide has involved "westernized" cultures subordinating indigenous pe-
nal codes and systems. Recently, tribal groups in countries such as Canada
and the United States, dissatisfied with the effect of punitive legal systems
on their members, have attempted to re-introduce ancient punishments such
as banishment to rehabilitate their members. Several officials and commen-
tators in these countries have responded that this form of punishment is
cruel and unusual, violating national and international human rights
standards. 1
This paper will argue that banishment should be allowed and found
consistent with human rights norms on one of two grounds. First, indi-
genous tribes should be able to defend banishment based on cultural
relativism. While this defense is often used to defend pernicious practices,
it is legitimate in the banishment context. Initially, indigenous groups val-
idly view banishment as a less severe punishment than most of society
because of a distinct world-view based on subsistence and living in
harmony with the land. Also, because indigenous tribes are self-contained
1. Critics have also leveled several other attacks against banishment that will not be
addressed in this paper. First, some have argued that allowing banishment will undermine the
universality-and thus the legitimacy-of mainstream sentencing guidelines. See, e.g., John
Balzar, Two Alaska Indian Youths Banished to Islands for Robbery, L.A. TIMES, July 15, 1994, at
A3 (stating "[p]rosecutors objected to the experiment, arguing that it would open the door to all
sorts of cultural exceptions and challenges to state law"). Others argued that the punishment was
too lenient. See, e.g., Michael Sangiacomo, 2 Youths Face Tribal Justice; May be Sentenced to
Remote Islands, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Sept. 1, 1994, at IA (noting "[o]thers look on the
banishment as an extended vacation for the boys who grew up hunting and fishing on the remote
islands") [hereinafter Sangiacomo, 2 Youths]. In the case of the banishment of two Alaska teens,
there were questions of whether the teens were actually isolated from society and each other,
especially after they were moved closer to their reservation after it was discovered that they were
on federal land. William C. Bradford, Reclaiming Indigenous Legal Autonomy on the Path to
Peaceful Coexistence: The Theory, Practice, and Limitations of Tribal Peacemaking in Indian
Dispute Resolution, 76 N.D. L. REV. 551, 595 (2000). Finally, there are questions of double jeop-
ardy because-again in the case of the Alaska teens-banishment ended up not being a substitute
for traditional sentencing. Id. at 596 n.246. Instead, the boys were sentenced to time in prison
even after completing their banishment. Id. at 596.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
and not covered under majoritarian laws, recognizing a cultural relativism
defense would not infringe upon the rights of nonindigenous citizens.
Second, countries should ratify recent "group rights" documents that
give indigenous groups sovereignty and an international juridical person-
ality. While these documents are not binding, they could eventually be
incorporated into customary international law. Nations should ratify these
documents to prevent the extinction of indigenous cultures based on both
deontological and teleological theories.
Part I of this paper will look at the history, aspects, and purposes of
banishment in indigenous cultures. Particularly, it will discuss modern ap-
plications of this sentence resulting from tribal circle sentencing. Part II
will discuss the arguments raised against banishment. It will discuss how
banishment potentially violates international human rights standards under
the literal language of the Body of Principles for the Protection of All
Persons Under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, 2 the Standard
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, 3 the Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,4
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.5 Finally, Part
III will analyze why banishment should be allowed. It will first focus on
the unique powerlessness, isolation, and near extinction of indigenous
groups. Next, it will address the recent "third generation" group rights doc-
uments under consideration by several human rights bodies and why these
documents should be adopted and voluntarily incorporated to create cus-
tomary international law supporting alternative indigenous sentencing.
Finally, it will consider why indigenous groups should validly be able to
use cultural relativism to defend banishment.
2. Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons Under Any Form of Detention or
Imprisonment, G.A. Res. 43/173, U.N. GAOR, 43d Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/43/49
(1988) [hereinafter Body of Principles].
3. Standard Minimum Rules for Treatment of Prisoners, E.S.C. Res. 663 (XXIV) C,
U.N. ESCOR, 24th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 11, U.N. Doc. E/3048 (1957) [hereinafter Standard
Minimum Rules].
4. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1984/72 (1984) [hereinafter Convention Against Torture].
5. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR,
21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1996) [hereinafter ICCPR].
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II. THE HISTORY, ASPECTS, AND PURPOSES OF BANISHMENT
A. THE HISTORY OF BANISHMENT
Societies employing widely divergent governments and value systems
have employed banishment in different forms;6 although in modem society,
"the punishment is not allowed .... "7 Banishment perhaps is most deeply
rooted in certain tribal cultures in the Americas, which have used the pun-
ishment for centuries. 8 For instance, the Cheyenne Law of Killing makes
reference to the traditional punishment of banishment for murder.9
B. MODERN APPLICATIONS OF BANISHMENT
In Canada and the United States, majoritarian courts have begun to
transfer cases involving indigenous defendants to tribal courts, which have
begun re-imposing the previously dormant sentence of banishment.' 0 In
Canada, tribes have begun reclaiming judicial sovereignty through the pro-
liferation of sentencing circles."I The key features of these circles are that
the community meets as a group to decide on sentencing, the offender con-
sents to the sentencing circle being conducted, and sentencing is achieved
by consensus of the circle. The primary goals these circles seek to achieve
are the restoration of the victim and re-integration of the offender into the
community. In R. v. Taylor,12 a Lac La Ronge Indian found guilty of sexual
6. See, e.g.. Rutherford v. Blankenship, 468 F. Supp. 1357, 1360 (W.D. Va. 1979); Stephanie
J. Kim, Note, Sentencing and Cultural Differences: Banishment of the American Indian Robbers,
29 JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. 239, 256 (1995) (noting that "[blanishment as a punishment has
existed throughout the world since ancient times"); Balzar, supra note 1, at A3 (indicating that
[a]mong others, ancient Greeks employed banishment for severe crimes, and England previously
banished criminals to the United States and Australia").
7. Kim, supra note 6, at 260; see also Blankenship, 468 F. Supp. at 1360-61 (holding that
banishing an individual from a state was against public policy); State v. Doughtie, 74 S.E.2d 922,
923 (N.C. 1953) (holding that North Carolina courts could not impose a sentence of banishment
from the state). These latter cases refer to the practice of banishment by the majoritarian criminal
justice system. There, banishment merely refers to prohibiting a United States citizen from return-
ing to a particular city or state. As will be seen, this form of punishment is much less severe than
the indigenous practice of banishment in degree if not in permanence.
8. R. v. Taylor, [1997] 163 Sask. R. 29 (Sask. C.A.), WestLaw, SASK-CS-ALL database, at
*2 (stating that "First Nations people have for centuries used banishment as a method of redress
for wrongdoing"). Because many indigenous cultures highly revere nature, they used banishment
rather than creating prisons that remove the offender from nature. See Kim, supra note 6, at 256
(stating that "[tihe absence of prisons prior to Columbus's arrival called for these forms of
punishment"). Banishment calls for the offender to reconnect with nature rather than to dis-
connect through physical barriers such as prison walls.
9. K.N. LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY 167 (1941).
10. Luke McNamara, Appellate Scrutiny of Circle Sentencing, 27 MAN. L.J. 209, 209 (2000).
11. Id.
12. Taylor, at *I (WestLaw, SASK-CS-ALL database). The importance of these circles in
reclaiming indigenous culture merits further discussion. Sentencing circles are a new form of
2004]
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assault requested and received a sentencing circle.' 3 The sentencing circle
eventually agreed' 4 on a sentence of "banishment to a remote island in nor-
them Saskatchewan for one year, followed by probation for three years."15
Similarly, in R. v. Lucas, 16 an indigenous sexual offender in the Yukon
restorative justice that have recently been'adopted in Minnesota and Canada. These circles com-
bine Native American and Aboriginal practices with majoritarian Western legal conceptions.
They were initiated because of the failures of the majoritarian justice system and "emphasize[]
rehabilitation and restoration over retribution." Rashmi Goel, No Women at the Center: The Use
of the Canadian Sentencing Circle in Domestic Violence Cases, 15 WISC. WOMEN'S L.J. 293, 317
(2000). While there are many variations on circle sentencing, the basic structure of the circles
utilized by the First Nation aboriginals will be presented as an example.
An accused pleads guilty to a crime in criminal court and voluntarily decides to attend a
sentencing circle if the prosecutor consents and certain criteria are met. These circles mainly exist
in small, tightly knit communities such as reservations. At a minimum, circles include the offen-
der, victim, judge, prosecutor, and members of the community. Both the victim and offender may
invite anyone else-such as family and friends-to sit in the circle. Typically, the offender and
victim also each have healing circles with those they will invite to the sentencing circle. The
purpose of these circles is for the victim to express her feelings to those she loves and trusts before
going before the community and for the offender to begin taking accountability for her actions.
Any community member may come to participate in the sentencing circle, and social workers,
psychologists and other experts may also be included, if necessary. See id. at 313.
All of these individuals sit in a circle, facing one another. Id. at 314. Often, each simply sits
in a chair with no barrier separating individuals. Id. One at a time, each individual is given the
opportunity to express her opinion and be heard by the others. Id. Often, some symbolic item is
passed around the circle, and the holder is the only one who can speak. Id. Each individual is
treated equally, and no individual has more power than anyone else. Id. After each individual has
spoken, the group reaches consensus on what sanction will best (1) restore the victim to her prior
position; (2) rehabilitate the offender and reintegrate her back into the community; and (3) serve
the needs of the community. See id. at 313-16.
The judge then later records the sentence at the courthouse, and, usually, follow up circles are
held in subsequent months to check on the progress of both the victim and offender. Id. at 314.
These circles have had well over a ninety percent success rate in Canada. Id.
Almost universally, those involved with circle sentencing have stated that the purpose of the
circles is to allow for the community to come up with creative sanctions not recognized by the
traditional justice system. Kay Pranis, Peacemaking Circles: Restorative Justice in Practice
Allows Victims and Offenders to Begin Repairing the Harm, CORRECTIONS TODAY, Dec. 1997, at
75.
This purpose is not merely related to the outcome reached but also to the collaborative
process needed to achieve it. This form of justice is seen as belonging to the community; circle
sentencing "is an exercise in building community, because it brings community members together
in a forum which ... encourages each community member to offer his or her gifts or capacities to
the process of finding solutions and implementing them." Id. at 76. The point of the process is
that community members are confronted with a different factual circumstance in each circle and
must craft a specific remedy that meets the need of the victim and offender involved. See id.
(stating that "[elach time the community gathers around a difficult problem and finds a way to
make the situation better, the community builds its capacity to solve problems").
13. Taylor, at *3 (WestLaw, SASK-CS-ALL database).
14. Actually, the sentencing circle reached consensus over the objection of the Crown-the
prosecutor in Canada-forming an additional basis upon which to appeal the sentence. Taylor, at
*3-*4 (WestLaw, SASK-CS-ALL database).
15. McNamara, supra note 10, at 231.
16. [1995] 56 B.C.A.C. 141 (Y.T. C.A.), WestLaw, CAN-ALLCASES database, at *5.
Although the court found banishment to be primarily rehabilitative, it is important to note that
indigenous justice systems also included punitive sanctions: "Retaliatory (private) and retributive
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Territory was "'banished' for a period of 12 months... to a First Nation
'bush settlement' called No-Gold"I7 by a quasi-sentencing circle.18
The United States had its first modern experience with this form of
banishment in 1994 with the sentencing of two Tlingit teenagers (Guthrie
and Roberts) convicted of armed robbery and assault with a deadly weap-
on. 19 Because the crime did not occur on a reservation, the district attor-
neys initially charged the two.20 Subsequently, a "Tlingit elder... secured
a form of plea bargain unique in American history." 21 The Superior Court
judge agreed that, upon guilty pleas by Guthrie and Roberts and payment of
a $25,000 bond, he would release the two to "the Kuye'di Kuiu Kwaan
Tribal Court (Tlingit TPM court)." 22 This transfer was conditioned on the
understanding that the court would impose a "sentence of a year-long ban-
ishment to make Guthrie and Roberts ruminate on their crime, purify their
spirits, and make restitution to [the victim]." 23
C. ASPECTS OF BANISHMENT
While the aspects of the punishment vary among tribes, 24 certain
central features can be ascertained from the recent banishments in Canada
(public) death and mutilation were also known as forms of 'punishment."' Samuel J. Brakel,
American Indian Tribal Courts, in INDIANS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 145, 149 (Laurence French
ed., 1982).
17. McNamara, supra note 10, at 214.
18. Id. As in Taylor, the Crown dissented, this time "not support[ing] the holding of a
circle." Id. at 213. While a literal sentencing circle was not held, "[a]ll persons who were present
and thought to be of importance by the accused and his counsel were heard. They were sworn at
once and sat as a group and shared each other's company while testifying. Each was able to defer
to another in answering questions." Id. at 214 (quoting R. v. Lucas, [19951 56 B.C.A.C. 141, at
para. 1). While this sentencing deviated from the sentencing circle form, "the disposition clearly
reflected the principles of community-based and culturally appropriate sentencing." Id.
19. Balzar, supra note 1, at Al. The two teenagers called for a pizza and then assaulted the
deliveryman from behind with a baseball bat. The teens then robbed their victim, and the attack
"fractur[ed] his skull in multiple places and le[ft] him deaf and partially blind." Bradford, supra
note 1, at 590.
20. The teens were charged "as adults with first-degree armed robbery and assault with a
deadly weapon. Under Washington law, these charges carried sentences of three to five and one-
half years in prison upon conviction." Bradford, supra note 1, at 590.
21. Id. at 590-91.
22. Id. at 591. The case was unique because, "in the post-Crow Dog era no state court had
ever previously referred a criminal case over which it had original jurisdiction and which arose
off-reservation to an Indian tribal court." Id. at 591 n.215.
23. Id. at 591. The elders also had to "promise[] that Guthrie and Roberts, while banished,
would cut enough pine logs so that upon their restoration to the tribe they would be able to build
[the victim] a new duplex and sell enough lumber to pay for the $3,000 worth of uncovered
medical bills." Id. at 591 n.217.
24. For instance, the Cheyenne Law of Killing states that "[b]anishment involves permanent
disability to attend renewal of the Arrows, or to eat or smoke from a Cheyenne utensil without
polluting it. It involves during the period of effective banishment disability to acquire coup hon-
ors [or other civil honors, or to officially perform acts of chieftainship ? but not disability to
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and the United States. In R. v. Taylor, Taylor was clandestinely taken "to a
remote location chosen by the Justice Committee' (composed of tribal
officials).25 Once there, Taylor had to "remain within a two mile radius of
the cabin at all times unless given permission by the Chairman of the...
Justice Committee." 26 The Committee was required to provide Taylor with
(1) a cabin with a wood stove, (2) "sufficient utensils for cooking and eat-
ing and storing of water, (3) sufficient tools for the cutting of fire wood,
[and] (4) sufficient material for snaring of animals for food."27
With these tools, Taylor was supposed to make additions to the cabin
he was given-such as installing insulation-and eventually build himself a
new cabin.28 Also, none of these tools were to be "gas or electrical
powered... unless authorized by the Justice Committee or Probation
Services." 29 Taylor was also "responsible for his own clothing while at the
cabin." 30
At the same time, the Committee provided Taylor with "sufficient food
every three weeks to allow for ... proper sustenance. . . ."31 Taylor was
also provided with a first aid kit and course materials for anger man-
agement, alcoholism, and general education. 32 He was allowed to procure
(at his own expense) a two-way radio for cases of emergency, and a re-
source person visited him to check his status. 33 Otherwise, Taylor was to
have no contact with any persons while banished except those persons
authorized to visit him by the Committee or Probation Services and mem-
bers of his immediate family.34 Family members were limited to one visit
per month for three hours.35
The period of banishment was approximately one year.36 A few mem-
bers of the sentencing circle noted that the sentence was particularly harsh
effectively engage in ordinary civil transactions of marriage, gift, and the like ? ]". LLEWELLYN &
HOEBEL, supra note 9, at 167 (alterations in original).
25. R. v. Taylor, [1997] 163 Sask. R. 29 (Sask. C.A.), WestLaw, SASK-CS-ALL database, at
*11.
26. Id. at *13.
27. Id.
28. Id. at *14.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at *13.
32. Id.
33. Id. at *13-*14.
34. Id. at *13.
35. Id. at *13-*14.
36. Id. at *12.
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and more suspect than prior banishments because of the severe wifiter
conditions in Northern Saskatchewan. 37
In the case of the Tlingit teenagers, they "were taken to a fishing boat
for transport to ... unidentified islands" off the Alaskan coast immediately
after sentencing.38 The teenagers were to remain on the islands for twelve
to eighteen months before being re-evaluated by the Superior Court.
39
Tribal elders provided the offenders with a limited supply of food for a
couple of weeks and "primitive" tools for hunting (such as fishing poles)
and cookingA0 Unlike in Taylor, the teenagers were not given food beyond
this initial period.41 The elders also assisted the offenders in building
twelve-by-eighteen foot one-room shelters with tarp roofs. 42 Finally, elders
gave the offenders two-way radios to communicate with the outside world
in case of emergency.4 3
The boys were only to take trips off the island when there were "medi-
cal emergencies and then under very strict guidelines." 44 There were sup-
posed to be no visitors to the island except elders checking on the boys'
status; unfortunately, this condition was breached, especially after the boys
had to be moved much closer to the mainland after it was discovered that
they were on federal land.
45
D. PURPOSES OF BANISHMENT
The largest dispute in the Taylor case was whether banishment was
primarily punitive or rehabilitative.4 6 If the punishment was more punitive,
it would be more susceptible to classification as cruel and unusual punish-
ment and less defensible as necessary to preserve indigenous culture.47 The
37. Id.
38. Experiment in Tribal Justice: 2 Youths are Banished, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1994, § 1, at 6
39. Thomas W. Haines, "Sorry Isn't Enough " -Contrite Kids Welcome Tribal Judgment,
SEAT-LE TIMES, July 16, 1994, at Al. Banishment was not always temporary in certain tribes.
See Justice Banished, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Aug. 13, 1995, at 2C (stating "[i]n ancient
times, driving a person out of his community for a crime was akin to a sentence of death").
40. Balzar, supra note 1, at A3; Tribe Banishes Duo to Alaskan Islands, WASH. POST, Sept.
4, 1994, at A30.
41. Balzar, supra note 1, at A3.
42. Bradford, supra note 1, at 595.
43. Michael Sangiacomo, A Different Kind of Justice: Alaskan Indian Court May Open Door
to Alternatives, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Sept. 11, 1994, at IA [hereinafter Sangiacomo,
Different].
44. Michael Sangiacomo, Judge Admits Teens Banishment a Failure, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland), Aug. 30, 1995, at 4A.
45. Id.
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Saskatchewan Court of Appeals decided not to classify banishment as
punitive, holding that "banishment ... tends to be more an individualized
measure having as its central purpose the influencing of the offender's
future behaviour ... than a punitive measure .... "48 Native Americans in
the United States have also "used this traditional form of punishment for
rehabilitative purposes." 49
It is important to note that individual rehabilitation is only one goal of
the punishment. The punishment is also intended to restore the victim to
his previous position and, ultimately, to re-integrate the offender back into
the tribe as a productive member of the community.50 The Cheyenne Law
of Killing describes banishment "combined with an almost certain ...
commutation []as a technique of multiple excellence. By removing the
murderer it lessened provocation to revenge; it disciplined the offender;
allowance was made for the return of the culprit; but only when dangers of
social disruption were over."5 1
The comments of those involved in the banishment of the Tlingit teen-
agers confirm the rehabilitative, restorative, and re-integrative goals of the
punishment. Roberts, one of the banished teens, "said his year of banish-
ment transformed him. Away from the 'negativity' of friends, troubles and
temptations, he faced his own demons-and resolved to change .... "52 His
comments also revealed the relevance of the punishment to indigenous
culture: "It was a time for self-respect, introspection, purification. It
helped me get back to my roots," he said.53 Instead of being separated from
nature through the prison artifice, Roberts was able to reconnect with the
pureness and primacy of nature.
48. Id.
49. Kim, supra note 6, at 256.
50. See RENNARD STRICKLAND, FIRE AND THE SPIRITS 168-74 (1975); Kim, supra note 6
(stating that "[the American Indian approach to criminal justice called for rehabilitation of the
criminal and assistance for the victim in order for the tribe to accept the criminal back into their
tribal group").
51. LLEWELLYN & HOEBEL, supra note 9, at 158. Contrast this with the permanent
banishment decried by the Supreme Court. For instance, in Trop v. Dulles, the Court found that
permanent banishment and denationalization from the United States was cruel and unusual
because a denationalized citizen is stateless, "a condition deplored in the international community
of democracies." 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958). The Court also found that denationalization was cruel
and unusual because it "subjects the individual to a fate of ever-increasing fear and distress." Id.
at 98-99. The banishment in this case was permanent; the banished individual could never again
regain his United States citizenship. Conversely, as previously noted, the central goal of banish-
ment is the ultimate rehabilitation and re-integration of the offender back into the tribe.
52. Debra Carlton Harrell, Tlingit Man Says He's Transformed After Year Alone; The




The superior court judge who referred the case to circle sentencing
concurred, stating that "he believe[d] Roberts' banishment helped smooth
the way for his reform." 54 The mother of the other banished teen concurred,
stating she was "really happy that the banishment took place ... [i]t was a
turning point in Simon's life."55
III. THE ARGUMENT AGAINST BANISHMENT
A. DOMESTIC CHALLENGES TO BANISHMENT
Several sources have objected to the recent imposition of banishment
by tribal courts in Canada and the United States based on domestic law.
After the sentencing circle imposed banishment in R. v. Taylor,56 the Crown
appealed on the ground that the punishment was punitive and constituted
cruel and unusual punishment. 57 While Judge Bayda of the Saskatchewan
Court of Appeals ultimately found the banishment to be a legitimate pun-
ishment, he recognized that he was doing so on "limited information" and
further acknowledged that banishment was suspect because it involved
"deprivation[,]... [s]partan amenities, [and] lack of intimate personal
contact .... "58 Bayda was also careful to limit his decision to the particular
conditions of banishment in the case before him, leaving open the possi-
bility that slightly more severe forms of banishment could be found
unconstitutional. 59
In Canada, then, banishment could ultimately be found unconstitutional
through appellate review. In this case, tribes would be able to challenge
such a decision in the Canadian Supreme Court. The Canadian Congress
could also proscribe banishment because "[f]ederal paramountcy and the
plenary doctrine authorizing a congressional override are reflected in
Canada to a degree with relevant variations, although [it] also ha[s] consti-
tutional protection for aboriginal and treaty rights." 60 Canada can thus reg-
ulate tribes under the Indian Act, but it usually is less coercive, often
engaging in "direct negotiations" with tribes.61
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. R. v. Taylor, [1997] 163 Sask. R. 29 (Sask. C.A.), WestLaw, SASK-CS-ALL database, at
*3.
57. Id. at *19.
58. Id.
59. Id. at * 19-*20. Judge Bayda also cited R. v. Malboeuf as an example of a case where the
banishment was proper. Id. (citing Malboeuf, [1982] 16 Sask. R. 77 (Sask. C.A.)).
60. Brad W. Morse, A View From the North: Aboriginal and Treaty Issues in Canada, 7 ST.
THOMAS L. REv. 671, 676 (1995).
61. Id. at 677.
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In the United States, others responded similarly to the banishment of
the Tlingit teenagers. 62 At least one court in the United States has, at least
partially, found that a tribal court could not impose a sentence under which
"the defendant was penalized more harshly because she entered the alter-
native court than someone charged with an identical offense whom did not
enter the alternative court." 63 Another has found that sentencing circles
may not deviate from established sentencing guidelines absent categorical
authorization from the prosecutor. 64
There are parallel tracks that banishment cases can follow. When a
case is referred from the traditional justice system to a sentencing circle, the
circle must make a recommendation that the judge then can translate into an
order in state or federal court.65 Thus, if a judge entered a circle's recom-
mendation of banishment and an appellate court found the punishment to be
62. See, e.g., Bradford, supra note 1, at 591-92 (stating that "critics condemned banishment
as a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the constitutional rights of the defendants or as a
violation of Alaskan child welfare laws").
63. Blackfeet Tribe v. Rutherford, No. 00-AC-41 (Blackfeet Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2000),
summary available at http://www.american.edu/academic.depts/spa/justice/publications/
2003caselawl.pdf (last visited Aug. 1, 2003). While the decision was not clear in its justification,
it did seem to indicate that the problem was not solely with the sentence imposed but with the fact
that that the offender'sdue process rights were violated. Id.
64. In 2000, Minnesota adopted sentencing circles. In State v. Pearson, Pearson "pleaded
guilty to felony theft by wrongfully obtaining public assistance." 609 N.W.2d 630, 631 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2000) rev'd, 636 N.W.2d 845 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002). The court then referred the case to a
sentencing circle that "recommended a stay of adjudication... and that Pearson be required to
pay restitution, obtain credit counseling and financial management help, perform community
volunteer work, and participate in support/follow-up circles." Id. at 632. The trial court then
adopted this sentence and stayed adjudication, a result it ordinarily could not have ordered because
there were not "special circumstances." Id. at 632-34. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding
that the statute authorizing restorative justice programs did "not indicate a legislative intent to
authorize restorative justice programs to assign a sanction that would be an improper sentence if
imposed by the district court." Id. at 633.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota then reversed, but only on the basis that, in this specific
case, the state agreed that there would be no limit on the sentencing circle's ability to craft an
alternative sanction unauthorized by law. See State v. Pearson, 637 N.W.2d 845, 848 (Minn.
2002). The decision explicitly acknowledged that it was not resolving the broader question of
whether sentencing circles could adopt alternative sanctions where the state only conditionally
consented to circle adjudication. See id. (holding that "we need not attempt ... to answer the
questions left open by the legislature...").
In a special concurrence, Justices Page and Anderson argued that the statute should be
construed broadly to allow sentencing circles to impose sanctions otherwise unauthorized by law.
They identified the central purpose of sentencing circles as reintegrating the offender back into the
community by allowing community members "to actively and meaningfully participate in the
criminal justice process." Id. at 850 (Page, J., concurring specially). While this case involved a
proescutorial challenge on the basis of the tribal sentence being too light, it also indicates that the
traditional justice system will not be entirely accommodating to the alternative sentence of
banishment. One might expect, then, that it will not be long before the government brings a
human rights claim against a Native American tribe for banishing one of its members.
65. See Pearson, 637 N.W.2d at 851.
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unconstitutional, the decision could then be challenged in the Supreme
Court or a state court of last resort. 66
If, however, the case originated in a tribal forum, the courts would
likely have no jurisdiction to hear a challenge to a sentence of banishment.
In Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,67 the Supreme Court held that federal
courts have no jurisdiction over almost all complaints under the Indian Civil
Rights Act;68 instead, federal courts can only hear indigenous habeas
cases.69
Still, there is precedent holding that habeas corpus review exists for
certain types of banishment. In 1991, the Senecas of the Tonawanda
Reservation banished "five tribal members who sought to overthrow the
traditional government of chiefs ...."70 These members were found guilty
of treason and "ordered... banished from Tonowanda Seneca Territory."
71
The banishment order to each of the members informed them as follows.
[Y]our name is removed from the tribal rolls, your Indian name is
taken away, and your lands will become the responsibility of the
Council of Chiefs. You are now stripped of your Indian Citizen-
ship and permanently lose any and all rights afforded our mem-
bers. YOU MUST LEAVE IMMEDIATELY AND WE WILL
WALK WITH YOU TO THE OUTER BORDERS OF OUR
TERRITORY.72
Under the literal wording of the Indian Civil Rights Act, habeas review
is only available when the petitioner has been "detained," 73 but courts have
interpreted this provision to confer jurisdiction when there is a sufficient
deprivation of liberty. 74 While the district court found no jurisdiction, in
Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians,75 "[t]he Second Circuit
Court of Appeals... reversed this ruling and held that the banishment deci-
sion... could be reviewed by the federal court."76 The case was then
66. See id.
67. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
68. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 72.
69. Id.
70. Robert B. Porter, Building a New Longhouse : The Case for Government Reform Within
the Six Nations of the Haudenosaunee, 46 BUFF L. REV. 805, 877 (1998).
71. Id. at 878.
72. Id. at 878 n.337 (quoting Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874,
895 (2d Cir. 1996) (emphasis in original)).
73. See 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (1994) (stating that habeas corpus review is available to challenge
detention).
74. Porter, supra note 70, at 879.
75. 85 F.3d 874, 895 (2d Cir. 1996).
76. Porter, supra note 70, at 879.
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remanded, and the matter has not yet been resolved, with the tribe still
contending it has the right to impose banishment.77 If such a challenge
were made to a sentence of temporary banishment, similar litigation might
ensue, with the tribe defending its sovereignty in federal court.
Conversely, other precedent implies federal habeas review might not be
available. In Shenandoah v. United States,78 a federal district court denied
habeas review to tribal members who suffered from a less severe form of
banishment. 79 These members were not asked to leave the reservation, and
they retained some tribal rights (such as heath'care) while losing others only
temporarily. 80 Thus, although they lost their "voice... preventing [them]
from participating in the Nation's political process and the Nation's
religious, cultural and social events," tribal authorities "offered a process to
restore plaintiffs' voices . ."81 The court found the banishment in Poodry
to be "much more severe"8 2 and denied habeas review, relying heavily on
the fact that "the punishments imposed were not permanent. ... "83
Because the banishment analyzed in this paper is similarly temporary, a
court could deny habeas review. Further, "[t]he Poodry [sic] decision was
unprecedented," and no subsequent case has allowed habeas review of any
form of banishment.84 Still, the banishment analyzed in this paper is cer-
tainly more severe than the banishment in Shenandoah as it involves tem-
porary denial of all tribal rights and physical removal from the reservation.
Even if tribal banishment cannot be reviewed and found uncon-
stitutional, Congress could easily pass legislation prohibiting banishment
under its plenary power over Native American tribes.85 A state could also
potentially proscribe banishment through legislation although the Indian
Civil Rights Act has practically foreclosed most state regulation of tribal
77. Id. at 880.
78. No. 96-CV-258 (RSP/GJD), 1997 WL 214947 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 1997).
79. Porter, supra note 70, at 861-62.
80. Id.
81. Shenandoah, 1997 WL 214947, at *7.
82. Id. at *8.
83. Porter, supra note 70, at 862. Although part of the defense was also that no "actual
banishment had occurred," this should not be relevant. Id. In Poodry, the court held that "the
existence of the orders of permanent banishment alone-even absent attempts to enforce
them-would be sufficient to satisfy the jurisdictional prerequisites for habeas corpus." Poodry v.
Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 895 (2d Cir. 1996).
84. Porter, supra note 70, at 879.
85. See Edo Banach, The Roma and the Native Americans: Encapsulated Communities
Within Larger Constitutional Regimes, 14 FLA. J. INT'L L. 353, 361 (stating that "the United




affairs. 86 Unfortunately, in either case, Native American tribes would be
unlikely to have any domestic redress besides convincing the legislature to
repeal the legislation.
87
B. POTENTIAL INTERNATIONAL CHALLENGES TO BANISHMENT
Should a government similarly challenge banishment in an inter-
national forum, it would likely have much support for finding the punish-
ment violates international human rights standards.
1. Body of Principles for the Protection of all Persons Under Any
Form of Detention or Imprisonment
If Canada or the United States decided to challenge the validity of
tribal banishment in an international forum, they would find literal support
in the Body of Principles for the Protection of all Persons Under any Form
of Detention or Imprisonment. 88 The United Nations General Assembly
adopted this document on December 9, 1988.89 Principle 1 of the treaty
begins with the general proposition that "[a]ll persons under any form of
detention or imprisonment shall be treated in a humane manner and with
respect for the inherent dignity of the human person."90
One specific principle arguably violated in banishment is the require-
ment that "[a] detained or imprisoned person.. . have the right to be visited
by and to correspond with, in particular, members of his family and.., be
given adequate opportunity to communicate with the outside world, subject
to reasonable conditions and restrictions as specified by law or lawful
regulations." 91 Of course, under banishment, the entire purpose of the sen-
tence is to isolate the offender completely for a term of months. In Taylor,
the offender could only have visits from his immediate family while the
Tlingit teens were supposed to have no personal visits. 92 While a certain
86. Previously, "Public Law 280 ... gave the states power.., over Native Americans on
Native American land." Banach, supra note 85, at 364. This law was "amended by the Indian
Civil Rights Act. . . which prevented a state from assuming jurisdiction over reservations with-
out the consent of its Indian tribes." Id. at 364 n.75. Further, the "Supreme Court has made it
clear that the states barely have any actual authority over the sovereign tribes. Id. at 364.
87. Id. at 365.
88. Banished offenders should be protected under this treaty because the term "[i]mprisoned
person" includes any person deprived of personal liberty as a result of conviction for an offense.
Body of Principles, supra note 2, at (c). Certainly, individuals confined to an island or bush settle-
ment are deprived of the requisite personal liberty.
89. Tullio Treves, The UN Body of Principles for the Protection of Detained or Imprisoned
Persons, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 578, 578 (1990).
90. Body of Principles, supra note 2, at Principle 1.
91. Id. at Principle 19.
92. See supra notes 46 and 48 and accompanying text.
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degree of isolation is inherently necessary in banishment, it would be dif-
ficult to say that the near exclusion of contact with the outside world in
these cases was "reasonable."
Principle 24 provides a further opportunity to find banishment un-
acceptable. That principle requires that "medical care and treatment ... be
provided whenever necessary" to prisoners.93 This principle would seem to
be especially essential in the case of individuals banished to a freezing
Alaskan island with minimal provision of food and heating sources. In the
case of the banished Tlingit teens, "[b]oth boys ... had physical problems
during their banishment." 94 Roberts "was rushed to a hospital with appen-
dicitis," and later "suffer[ed] from an infected toe and scabies" without
treatment.95 Meanwhile, officials had to take Guthrie off the island to re-
move a wisdom tooth, and he later had problems with another wisdom tooth
that had to be removed. 96
While none of these maladies presented an extreme emergency, one
could easily imagine a situation where a banished offender suffered a heart
attack, stroke, or other illness that required immediate attention. Because
banished offenders need to be isolated from society, they are necessarily
placed at a great distance from "civilization"-" 15 hours away by boat..."
in the case of the Tlingit teenagers. 97 This distance could realistically be
expected to prevent adequate treatment in cases of emergency. Guthrie re-
counted an experience where he was hiking and fell into a swamp hole,
soaking his clothing. He explained how "it was snowing and it was really
cold .... The added weight.., slowed me down a lot. It started to get
dark, and I could have died then." 98 If Guthrie had been farther away from
his cabin, he indeed could have died with no assistance for over half a day.
Another principle that would seem facially to prohibit banishment is
Principle 6, which holds that "[n]o person under any form of detention or
imprisonment shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or
93. Body of Principles, supra note 2, at Principle 19.
94. Michael Sangiacomo, 'Banishment' of Indian Teens Under Review; Lead Tribal Judge




97. Id. The boys were later moved to an island ten minutes away when it was discovered
that they were on federal land. Id. This presented many problems, however, as the teenagers
began to get visits from both relatives and strangers, undermining the purposes of banishment. Id.
This led to tribal judges trying to work out a plan where the teenagers would be moved farther
away. Id.




degrading treatment or punishment."99 As important as this language is the
universality of the prohibition, "no circumstances whatever may be invoked
as a justification for torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment."100 This proscription is arguably even broader than the pro-
scription contained in the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment for two reasons. First, the
Convention is absolute, allowing for no exceptions. Second, the footnote to
Principle 6 indicates that "[tihe term 'cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment' should be interpreted so as to extend the widest possible
protection against abuses ...... "101
Of course, the problem with this and other principles is that the Body
of Principles is not a treaty, so it has "no binding force as such." 102 Still,
the document was approved "by consensus by the United Nations General
Assembly"-of which both Canada and the United States are mem-
bers-and there is a widespread belief that the Principles may lead "to the
crystallization of some principles into customary law."103
2. The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman,
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention Against
Torture) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights
The Convention Against Torture came into force in 1984.104 Canada
ratified the Convention on June 24, 1987,105 and the treaty came into force
in the United States on November 20, 1994.106 While banishment could not
be seen as a form of torture, 107 it could be construed as an "act[] of cruel,
99. Body of Principles, supra note 2, at Principle 6.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Treves, supra note 89, at 585.
103. Id.
104. Nan D. Miller, Comment, International Protection of the Rights of Prisoners: Is
Solitary Confinement in the United States a Violation of International Standards?, 26 CAL. W.
INT'L L.J. 139, 141 n.10 (1995).
105. Lawyers' Right Watch Canada, International Law*, at http://www.lrwc.org/
standard.php (last visited April 10, 2003) [hereinafter Right Watch].
106. DAVID WEISSBRODT ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 125 (3. ed. 2001).
107. Under the Convention:
"torture" means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental,
is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third
person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has
committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a
third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or
suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of
a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain
or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.
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inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment... "108 under the
Convention. This is especially true because the Convention covers "not
only ... punishment, but also ... other cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatments and is therefore far broader than its antecedents."1 09 Regrettably,
"as with other human rights documents, the Convention does not define"
these forms of punishment, so "the international standard for the humane
treatment of prisoners must be derived from the work of the interpreting
bodies."l10
a. European Court of Human Rights Cases
The body that has principally interpreted a similar provision has been
the European Court of Human Rights. In Soering v. United Kingdom, IlI the
court held that inhuman treatment must be evaluated by the totality of the
circumstances.11 2 While this test might still be ambiguous, the court also
held that "inhuman treatment covers at least such treatment as deliberately
causes severe suffering, mental or physical."ll 3 This standard seems to re-
late to the mindset of the judges imposing punishments. If a judge intends
to cause severe suffering to an offender, she violates the Convention. On
this level, at least, it seems that a government could legitimately claim
cultural relativism as a defense. If a government-as represented by its
judges-legitimately feels a punishment will not cause severe suffering
based on its culture, it is hard to argue it has acted deliberately.
Still, the prisoner is offered further protection by Soering, which held
that "treatment of an individual may be said to be degrading if it grossly
humiliates [the prisoner] before others or drives him to act against his own
will or conscience." 1 l4 By focusing on the humiliation of the victim, this
standard will often preclude a governmental cultural relativism defense
Convention Against Torture, supra note 4, at art. 1. There is no coercion or intent to procure a
confession under banishment because the offender has already admitted his guilt. It would also be
difficult to argue that tribal authorities intend to inflict severe pain through banishment when its
stated purpose is rehabilitation. Instead, banishment seems only to involve hardships that are
incidental.
108. Id. at art. 16.
109. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice: Identifying
International Procedural Protections in National Constitutions, 3 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 235,
262 (1993).
110. Miller, supra note 104, at 146, 149.
111. 161 Eur.Ct.H.R. (ser. A) (1989), available at http://www.kentlaw.edu/classes/bbrown/
Soering%20case%20ECHR.doc (last visited Apr. 12, 2003).
112. Soering, http://www.kentlaw.edu/classes/bbrown/Soering%20case%20ECHR.doc, at
para. 105.




against a prisoner's claim. The important point in the banishment context,
however, is that an indigenous offender can only be subject to a sentencing
circle through his own consent. Thus, the challenge would likely come
from the majoritarian government.115
Here, the European Court's decision in Hilton v. United Kingdom" 6 is
particularly instructive. There, the court considered whether a particular
case of solitary confinement constituted inhuman or degrading treatment.' 17
Using the "totality of the conditions," the court found that the conditions of
confinement were extremely unsatisfactory and that the prisoner did suffer
from some adverse psychological effects.118 However, the deciding factor,
in finding the confinement to be acceptable was that the solitary confine-
ment of the prisoner was often at his own request for fear of hostilities from
other prisoners. 119
While few would argue that a particularly egregious case of torture
would be acceptable because the prisoner "consented," the singular nature
of banishment makes it seem acceptable under the Covenant.120 Part of the
reason outsiders may consider banishment humiliating for the prisoner is a
misunderstanding of language. According to the tribal elder who secured
the alternate sentencing, "[p]art of the problem here is the interpretation of
the word banishment .... We don't look on it as banishment, but as a
purification rite." 121 The banishment of an offender from the tribe to an
island does not reflect the tribe expelling shameful members; it reflects the
tribe asking the offender to re-connect with his roots to respect his heritage.
In fact, traditional sentencing would be more shameful to the tribe and
the offender. Without facing banishment, the offenders would "never be
accepted back in the tribe."122 Conversely, at the end of the banishment,
offenders are welcomed back into their tribe with a great feast and the crime
is never spoken of again.123 At this point, it is also constructive to consider
115. Of course, an offender might consent to a sentencing circle but then disagree with the
imposition of banishment. Also, an offender may initially agree to banishment but then be unable
to cope with it in practice.
116. 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. 104 (1978).
117. Miller, supra note 104, at 151-52 (citing Hilton, 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. At 125-27, paras. 88-
102).
118. Id. (citing Hilton, 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. At 125-27, paras. 88-102).
119. Id. (citing Hilton, 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. At 124-25, paras. 93-94).
120. While no court has ever held explicitly that an otherwise cruel punishment could be
acceptable solely because the prisoner consented, some authors have at least considered this
possibility. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Let's Make a Deal: Waiving the Eighth Amendment
by Selecting a Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 32 CONN. L. REV. 615, 617 (2000) (rejecting the
proposition that a defendant's consent can waive Eight Amendment protections).
121. Sangiacomo, 2 Youths, supra note 1, at IA.
122. Balzar, supra note 1, at A3.
123. Sangiacomo, Different, supra note 43, at IA.
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how traditional forms of punishment sometimes considered inhuman
compare with banishment.
b. Death Row Phenomenon Generally
The conclusion in Soering is as significant to banishment as the criteria
it established for determining inhuman treatment. 124 In Soering, the court
found that extradition of a German national to the United States would ex-
pose him to "death row phenomenon,"125 despite the fact that the death
penalty itself had not yet been found to constitute inhuman treatment.
1 26
This "phenomenon" refers to the anguish resulting from being confined to
death row (specifically, in Virginia):
... the delays[,] the appeal and review procedures following a
death sentence, psychological trauma, the fact ... that the judge or
jury in determining sentence is not obliged to take into account the
defendant's age and mental state at the time of the offense; the
extreme conditions of his future detention on "death row" in
Mecklenburg Correctional Center, where he expects to be the
victim of violence and sexual abuse because of his age, color and
nationality; and the execution itself including the ritual of
execution. 27
The court explicitly qualified this holding by stating that it was based
on the specifics of the prisoner and the death row conditions in the parti-
cular state where he would be confined.128 In Virginia, "a condemned pris-
oner can expect to spend ... six to eight years" on death row before being
executed.129 Prisoners also face "the risk of homosexual abuse and physical
attack... ."130 Meanwhile, "[a]t the time of the killings [Soering] was only
18 years old and there [wa]s some psychiatric evidence.., that he 'was
suffering from [such] an abnormality of mind ... as substantially impaired
his mental responsibility for his acts."' 1 31
In some senses, the banishment of the Tlingit teenagers was similar to
Soering's imminent extradition to Virginia's death row. Roberts and Guth-
rie were both fifteen when they committed their crime, three years younger
124. 161 Eur.Ct.H.R. (ser. A) (1989), available at http://www.drugtext.org/library/
legal/evrm I.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2003).
125. Id. at para. 122.
126. ld. at para. 101.
127. Id. at para. 105.
128. Id. at para. 106.
129. Id.
130. Id. at para. 107.
131. Id. at para. 108.
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than Soering.132 There was no evidence of mental deficiency in either
Guthrie or Roberts, but both indicated that they were suicidal in the early
days of their banishment. 33 While the Tlingits faced no fear of sexual a-
buse or human attack, they were forced to gather food and wood in the
harsh Alaskan winter while surrounded by wolves and other dangerous
animals.134 Guthrie admitted that, because of all the dangerous animals, he
"was scared to go outside at night" at first. 135
While these factors were similar, two key aspects of banishment make
it less suspect. First, death row phenomenon primarily exists because "the
condemned prisoner has to endure for many years the conditions on death
row and the anguish and mounting tension of living in the ever-present
shadow of death."136 Second, as previously noted, the average time spent
on death row in Virginia was between six to eight years.137 This extended
period of time spent merely anticipating death perpetually deteriorates the
prisoner's mental and emotional condition. Conversely, banishment typi-
cally lasts for only six to eighteen months. Also, the offender knows that,
after his release, he will be completely free and welcomed back into his
tribe. This encourages the rehabilitation that is the central focus in banish-
ment. Far from being despondent, the offender is encouraged to improve so
he can reintegrate into his tribe.
It is also important to note that the United Nations Human Rights
Committee has subsequently rejected claims alleging that extradition would
subject prisoners to death row phenomenon. The U.N. "Human Rights
Committee's primary purpose is to evaluate complaints brought pursuant to
the First Optional Protocol of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights"138 (ICCPR). Article 7 of the ICCPR prohibits torture and
"cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment." 39 In at least two
cases, the Human Rights Committee has rejected claims that particular
132. Harrell, supra note 52, at A].
133. The banishment of Guthrie and Roberts was tracked in a documentary marking their
progress. When asked about "Being depressed and suicidal tendencies," Roberts responded that
he was not suicidal, but he "thought about it" in the early days of banishment. Guthrie similarly
responded, "It was lonely, depressing. It was pretty bad. I almost jumped ship there for the first




136. Soering v. The United Kingdom, 161 Eur.Ct.H.R. (ser. A) (1989), available at http://
www.drugtext.org/library/legal/evrml.html, at para. 106 (last visited Apr. 12, 2003).
137. Id.
138. Miller, supra note 104, at 152.
139. ICCPR, supra note 5, at art. 7.
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cases of death row phenomenon violate Article 7.140 Although these cases
merely distinguished and did not overrule Soering, they certainly narrowed
the applicability of death row phenomenon by holding that prolonged stays
on death row are not inhuman if they result from the prisoner "availing
himself of appellate remedies."141 Canada and the United States both have
ratified the ICCPR, although the United States has indicated that it is not
self-executing.142 Conversely, the Privy Court in England143 and the Su-
preme Court of Zimbabwe44 applied Soering's reasoning in finding human
rights violations for extended stays on death row.
c. Solitary Confinement Generally
Until the late nineteenth century United States prisons frequently "used
solitary confinement as the sole means of incarceration .. ."145 Eventually
in In re Medley, 46 the Supreme Court found that a punishment consisting
solely of solitary confinement was "an additional punishment of the most
important and painful character. . ." and thus violative of the Eighth
Amendment.147 Part of the basis for considering solitary confinement to be
an "additional punishment" is that "the administrative decision to place a
prisoner in isolation is not based on the underlying offense ... but instead
on activities that occur within the prison .... "148
While the conditions of solitary confinement obviously differ, the
punishment contains certain key features. Prisoners in solitary confinement
140. See, e.g., Cox v. Canada, Communication No. 539/1993, (Nov. 1994), U.N. Doc.
A/48/40, para. 17.2 (rejecting application of death row phenomenon to article 7 despite evidence
of potential psychological stress and the possibility of fifteen years on death row before
execution); Kindler v. Canada, Communication No. 470/1991, (July 1993), U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/48/D/470/1991, para. 15.3 (acknowledging the validity of death row phenomenon but
rejecting it in this case under article 7 because of lack of specificity in Kindler's submissions).
141. Kindler, Communication No. 470/1991, para. 6.4.
142. See WEISSBRODT ET AL, supra note 106, at 125-26 (stating that the United States has
ratified the Covenant but declared that it is not self-executing); Right Watch, supra note 105
(noting "Canada signed this covenant on May 19, 1976.").
143. Pratt & Morgan v. Attorney General for Jamaica, [1994] 2 A.C. 1, 35 (P.C. 1993)
(holding that keeping prisoners on death row for fourteen years constituted an inhuman act).
"[D]uring the nineteenth century," the Privy Council "had been the supreme appellate tribunal for
the British Empire and is now developing into a human rights court for the British
Commonwealth." Daniel P. Blank, Book Note, Mumia Abu-Jamal and the "Death Row
Phenomenon," 48 STAN. L. REV. 1625, 1633 (1996).
144. Pratt & Morgan, 2 A.C. at 31 (citing the unreported decision in Catholic Commission
for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe v. Attorney-General, Judgment No. S.C. 73/93 (June 24,
1993)).
145. Miller, supra note 104, at 155.
146. 134 U.S. 160 (1890).
147. Medley, 134 U.S. at 171.
148. Miller, supra note 104, at 156.
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are prevented from "[p]articipation in any social function, or any form of
contact with other prisoners . ."149 The cell in which the prisoner stays is
barren and dim, and he or she is "completely isolated from the natural
environment and from most of the natural rhythms of life."150 It is this lack
of "social stimulation" that is potentially detrimental to inmates.151
Studies by Dr. Stuart Grassian, in connection with a class action suit,
found that inmates subjected to solitary confinement in a Massachusetts
prison displayed remarkably consistent psychiatric symptoms.1 52 These
symptoms-which have been referred to as "Reduced Environmental
Stimulation" Syndrome-"includ[e] generalized hypersensitivity to external
stimuli, perceptual distortions, hallucination, derealized experiences,
anxiety, difficulties with thinking, concentration and memory, and impulse
control." 53 This syndrome is consistent with earlier studies finding that
solitary confinement can lead to "a 'hallucinatory, paranoid, confusional
psychosis' . . . ."154
The Human Rights Committee is the primary body that has found
human rights violations based on solitary confinement. In the early 1980s,
the Committee, in its Annual Report, indicated that "[e]ven such a measure
as solitary confinement may, according to the circumstances, and especially
when the person is kept incommunicado, be contrary to... article (7). .."
of the Protocol.155 Based on this report, the Committee has "receive[d]
numerous communications alleging violations of Article 7 and 10 due to
solitary confinement conditions." 156 Article 7 prohibits torture and "cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment." 157 Meanwhile, Article 10
states that "[a]ll persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with
humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person."158
In a few cases, the Committee has found violations of the Protocol
based on particular cases of solitary confinement. In one case, the
Committee found violations of both articles "[wihere a hostage was kept in
149. Id. at 157, n. 128 (describing conditions in high-security German prisons).
150. Id. at 158.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 162.
153. Id. Importantly, for the most part, "the inmates denied ever having experienced these
symptoms prior to their solitary confinement and reported that symptoms subsided rapidly after
their release from isolation." Id.
154. Id. at 161.
155. Miller, supra note 104, at 153 (quoting the Annual Report of the Committee to the
General Assembly, (1981-1982) II Y.B. Hum. Rts. Comm., 383, U.N. Doc. CCPR/3/Add.1
(1989)).
156. Id.
157. ICCPR, supra note 5, at art. 7.
158. Id. at art. 10.
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a damp, windowless cell underground for twenty-four hours a day with only
a mattress ...."159 In another, the Committee again found violations of
both articles when a prisoner "was held for one month in 'La Isla,' a prison
wing of small windowless cells where artificial light was left on for twenty-
four hours a day." 160
In one sense, banishment is similar to solitary confinement. Banished
offenders are entirely excluded from social functions and contact with
others for extended periods. In most other senses, however, the punish-
ments are distinct. Banishment is not an additional punishment based on
behavior in prison; rather, it is the original punishment intended for the
offense. Rather than being completely isolated from the natural environ-
ment, banished offenders are completely integrated into nature. While they
do not interact with other people, banished individuals are exposed to
significant environmental stimuli and not confined by barren walls.
3. Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners
The United Nations Economic and Social Council approved the
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners in 1957.161 These
Rules "have been increasingly recognized as a generally acceptable body of
basic minimal requirements."162 In the United States, six states have ex-
plicitly adopted the Rules, and while the "1962 Model Penal Code and the
correctional standards developed by the National Advisory Commission on
Criminal Justice Standards and Goals in 1973" based its provisions on the
Rules. 163 Most importantly, Minnesota, one of the states adopting the
Rules, is the first state experimenting with the use of sentencing circles in
the United States. Meanwhile, Canada has endorsed the Rules and incor-
porated most of its provisions into its "law and correctional policy."164
The Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Principles largely
focus on the health and physical condition of the prisoner. Article 32(2) of
the Rules prohibits "any other punishment that may be prejudicial to the
physical or mental health of a prisoner."165 Certainly, placing offenders on
islands in the bitter cold of the Alaskan winter with minimal heating and
159. Miller, supra note 104, at 153-54.
160. Id. at 154.
161. Id. at 147.
162. Daniel L. Skoler, World Implementation of the United Nations Standard Minimum
Rules for Treatment of Prisoners, 10 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 453, 455 (1975).
163. Miller, supra note 104, at 148.
164. Correctional Services of Canada, United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the
Treatment of Prisoners, http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/text/pblct/rights/50yrs/50yrs-07-e.shtml.
165. Standard Minimum Rules, supra note 3, at art. 32.
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limited food presents a substantial possibility that the offenders will become
extremely ill. As previously noted, both the Tlingit teenagers suffered from
serious illness likely related to the extreme conditions on their islands. 166
4. Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights Offers No Protection to Indigenous Group Rights
The plain language of Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights appears to provide protection for indigenous group
rights, at least in a limited sense. That article holds that "minorities ...
shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their
group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion,
or to use their own language."167
Unfortunately, the United Nations Human Rights Committee has
construed this right as "an individual right to participation in the group, not
a group right per se." 168 In Lovelace, the Committee found "that a Maliseet
Indian woman's Article 27 rights were violated by a Canadian law which
took away her status as an Indian upon her marriage to a non-Indian, there-
by preventing her from returning to her reservation upon the termination of
the marriage." 69 Unfortunately, the implication of this decision is that an
indigenous tribe could not defend its cultural practices against majoritarian
challenge: "[W]ere the Committee faced with a group-based claim by the
Maliseet tribe for the exclusion of a tribal woman from the reservation due
to her marriage outside the tribe, it would be unlikely to honor it ... "170 In
the same sense, then, a tribe would unlikely be able to challenge a law
prohibiting the imposition of banishment in tribal courts.
Thus, the Committee has distorted an Article ostensibly devoted to
securing group rights, interpreting it "to accord with [majoritarian] indivi-
dualist assumptions."' 7' While this is beneficial to the extent that indivi-
dual tribal members now have the ability to challenge their exclusion from
their tribes, it leaves the tribes themselves with no power to defend the
practices that make them distinct. Therefore, viewed properly, Article 27
actually undermines the ability of tribes to practice their culture.
166. Sangiacomo, Banishment, supra note 94, at 13A.
167. ICCR, supra note 5, at art. 27.
168. Richard Herz, Legal Protection for Indigenous Cultures: Sacred Sites and Communal
Rights, 79 VA. L. REv. 691, 708 (1993).
169. Id. (quoting Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp.
No. 40, Annex 18, at 166-75, U.N. Doc. A/36/40 (1981)).
170. Id. at 709.
171. Id. at 708.
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IV. WHY BANISHMENT SHOULD BE ALLOWED
If a country found banishment to be unconstitutional under domestic
law, a tribe would likely presently have no remedy under any international
law document to preserve its sovereignty. 72 Therefore, this section first ar-
gues that several international "group rights" documents should be ratified
to develop customary international law protecting the sovereignty of
indigenous tribes.
Alternatively, if a country attempted to procure a ruling from an inter-
national court that banishment violates international human rights stan-
dards, the tribe imposing the sentence could raise a defense of cultural
relativism. While this defense has been widely criticized-especially as
utilized by Middle Eastern countries-it should be seen as a valid defense
for indigenous tribes, primarily because (1) tribes are self-contained, and
the laws governing them do not affect the majority population; and (2)
banishment is legitimately seen as less severe by indigenous groups based
on a distinct world-view.
A. INTRODUCTION-THE MISTREATMENT OF INDIGENOUS GROUPS
Before considering the two main justifications for allowing banishment
and similar indigenous punishments, the precarious position of indigenous
culture must be acknowledged as providing context. The first major point
recognized by most scholars is that "[ilndigenous cultures throughout the
world have faced eradication by discrimination, assimilation, genocide, and
most recently, the accelerating pace of economic development."1 73 In terms
of a cultural relativism defense, this categorical cultural genocide
distinguishes indigenous culture from the cultures of Middle Eastern coun-
tries, which most often raise the cultural relativism defense. A Native
American tribe could legitimately claim that its inability to engage in
unique cultural practices would destroy the vestiges of its culture to which
it is still clinging; however, a Middle Eastern culture would have more dif-
ficulty claiming it would lose its identity if its subjugation of women were
prohibited. 174
172. See infra note 186 and accompanying text.
173. Herz, supra note 168, at 691.
174. See, e.g., Heather S. Archer, Comment, Effect of United Nations Draft Declaration on
Indigenous Rights on Current Policies of Member States, 5 J. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 205, 238 (1999)
("Without any one of these rights, the indigenous group's culture will ultimately fail"); Bradford,
supra note 1, at n.259 (stating "[t]he past century has been particularly devastating to the integrity
of traditional tribal cultures, and the destruction of traditional spirituality, which bound individuals




"How people resolve, or rather, how the legal system requires people to
resolve, their disputes, has everything to do with what kind of people they
are and what kind of people their children will become."175 Tribal legal
systems reflect "the closed nature of tribal communities and the
[concomitant] obligations of individual tribal members to perpetuate estab-
lished norms." 176 A punishment such as banishment is "integrally related to
an overall process of keeping the peace and ensuring that internal disputes
[a]re minimized and the functioning of the community undisturbed."1 77
Rather than utilizing an adversarial litigation-based system that focuses
on individual culpability, many tribes used cooperative justice resulting in
restorative and rehabilitative punishments that enhance the community. If
tribes were forced to adopt litigation and traditional individualized sanc-
tioning, it would "increase the likelihood that their members w[ould] focus
exclusively on the vindication of their individual rights, and thus, mar-
ginalize their relationship to each other and their communities." 178 By thus
losing their group mentality, "tribal communities w[ould] become in-
creasingly indistinct from American society at large," assimilated to the
point of extinction.1 79
Concurrently, "the political marginality of Native American groups
virtually assures that law makers and enforcers will tend to be insensitive to
Native American concerns, if not wholly ignorant of them."' 80 This makes
the adoption of the international agreements recognizing indigenous "group
rights" essential. Not only are indigenous groups relatively disempowered
compared with other minority groups, but their ultimate goal-and the
ultimate solution for them-is not assimilation and "equal" protection
through universal rights.
The position of indigenous groups is distinct from the position of
virtually any other minority group. Here, the United States provides an
instructive example. In the United States, "[wiomen, blacks, and poor
white males had grown up... without ever having known a separate nation
of their own . ."181 In seeking to overcome disenfranchisement, "repre-
sentatives deputized by these groups petitioned forcefully for [their] full
175. Robert B. Porter, Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty Through Peacemaking: How the
Anglo-American Legal Tradition Destroys Indigenous Societies, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
235,276 (1997).
176. Id. at 255.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 273.
179. Id. at 274.
180. Herz, supra note 168, at 693.
181. David Williams, Legitimation and Statutory Interpretation: Conquest, Consent, and
Community in Federal Indian Law, 80 VA. L. REV. 403, 422 (1994).
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inclusion . ."182 In contrast, "American Indians... did not grow up with-
in the territorial United States" and "almost universally ... resisted"
assimilation. 183
The inclusion of, Native Americans into the majoritarian culture also
differed substantively from the inclusion of other groups. After being given
equal rights, the other minority groups functionally "stood before the
government on the same footing as all other citizens, entitled to command
their representatives through the system of democratic accountability."1 84
While their voices may still be marginalized in this system, it is still their
system. For Native Americans, "the promise of majoritarianism [was] not
one of self-determination; it is rather one of subjection to an alien
power."1 85
Indigenous groups seeking protection against the majoritarian
government of the country in which they reside currently have no inter-
national means of redress; "[t]o this day, international law does not
recognize assertions of collective cultural rights by aboriginal peoples
against state sovereignty, treaties between indigenous peoples and states, or
indigenous peoples' rights to self-determination."1 86 This absolute power-
lessness distinguishes indigenous individuals from other minorities.187
B. GOVERNMENTS SHOULD RATIFY GROUP RIGHTS DOCUMENTS TO
CREATE CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
Some scholars have classified human rights into three "generations."
The first, and most categorically accepted, generation includes the "civil
and political rights enshrined as universal moral imperatives in the United
Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights."188 These documents
182. Id. at 422-23.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 423. It is, of course, false to state that women and non-indigenous racial
minorities are substantively "equal." Many sources "argu[e] that individual enfranchisement and
rights are not sufficient to secure justice for women and minorities." Id. at 423 n.62.
185. Id. at 423-24; see also Philip Frickey, Context and Legitimacy in Federal Indian Law,
94 MICH. L. REv. 1973, 1975 (196) (arguing that "Native Americans are essentially foreigners in
their own country, both culturally and legally").
186. Herz, supra note 168, at 696.
187. See id. at 696 (stating that "[tihe international system is particularly unsympathetic to
the concerns of indigenous minority groups" in relation to other minority groups"); Porter, supra
note 175, at 275 (stating that "[t]he indigenous people, the smallest and most fragile minority
within the American polity, run the greatest risk of actually disappearing out of existence").
188. Bradford, supra note 1, at 597 n.249.
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generally enshrine "negative" rights, merely obligating states to avoid
interference with these individual rights. 189
The international community has been less prompt and universal190 in
adopting second-generation rights: "essentially individual entitlements to
economic, social, and cultural benefits ... ."191 Although these "positive"
rights require affirmative action on the part of states in securing entitle-
ments to their citizens, "much of the international community" supports
them, at least in principle.192
Finally, the most recent and least recognized "'third generation' human
rights.., are designed to endow indigenous groups qua groups with legal
personality and standing to bring complaints against states for violation of
collective rights of indigenous peoples."193 There have been several rea-
sons for the static recognition of these rights. The most benign factor is a
lack of understanding: "Americans genuinely seem perplexed by the issue
of group rights."194 Yet, there are likely more pernicious forces behind this
ostensible insouciance. There is a valid argument that "[sitates have a
vested interest in not recognizing group claims because doing so would
undermine their exclusivity as actors on the international scene."195
As previously stated, a majoritarian government is currently immune
from tribal group challenges; 96 "states themselves are the dominant players
within the international law system,"197 and indigenous groups have no
independent recognition. A country's national Constitution is absolutely
su=preme, and no indigenous legal documents are seen as crafting out
exceptions to its universality. If group rights documents are adopted, there
is some legitimacy to the argument that indigenous groups can challenge
the majority government's laws internationally.
189. See id. (stating that these agreements "obligate state noninterference in what have
generally been considered individual rights").
190. Id.; see also Herz, supra note 168, at 691-92 (arguing that "[a] collective identity apart
from and yet within the state's collective identity undermines the state's claim to territorial
sovereignty as well as its status as the representative of all citizens").
191. Bradford, supra note 1, at 597 n.249.
192. This "'[progressive realization' ... reflects the reality that the realization of economic,
social and cultural rights depends on the availability of resources and societal structures rather
than state abstention." WEISSBRODT ET AL., supra note 106, at 91.
193. Bradford, supra note 1, at 597 n.249.
194. Lawrence Rosenn, Book Review, The Right to be Different: Indigenous Peoples and
the Quest for a Unified Theory, 107 YALE L.J. 227, 227 (1997); see also Herz, supra note 168, at
692 (stating that "[a] general insensitivity to communal rights resonates in both the American and
international legal systems").
195. Herz, supra note 168, at 694.
196. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
197. Herz, supra note 168, at 694.
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The most controlling yet least expansive iteration of indigenous group
rights is found in the International Labor Organization's Convention
Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (ILO
169).198 Article 8 of ILO 169 acknowledges that indigenous "... peoples
shall have the right to retain their own customs and institutions, where these
are not incompatible with fundamental rights defined by the national legal
system and with internationally recognized human rights."199 While ILO
169 entered into force on September 5, 1991, its analysis is (perhaps pur-
posefully) circular. While Article 8 recognizes indigenous rights, it pro-
scribes these rights according to both national and customary international
law. This circumspection means the recognition is a nullity; indigenous
rights only begin where majoritarian proscription ends. Further, the United
States has refused to ratify ILO 169 and appears unlikely to ever become a
party. 200 Canada has refused to ratify it as well. 201
The previous version of the ILO Convention was widely criticized as
"an ineffective tool for the protection of indigenous rights because the
predominant thrust of the document was the assimilation of indigenous
peoples into mainstream society." 202 While the new Convention is not lit-
erally assimilationist, it does adopt an assimilationist theory of indigenous
rights, both defining and circumscribing majority rights based on
majoritarian culture.
The still unratified Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples203 contains a more expansive and explicit recognition of
collective indigenous rights. Article 11 (2) recognizes that "[i]ndigenous
peoples have collective rights that are indispensable to the enjoyment of the
individual human rights of their members." 204 Significantly, the Proposed
198. Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, Jun.
27, 1989, 169 I.L.O. 1989 [hereinafter ILO 169].
199. Id. at art. 8.
200. See Elizabeth A. Pearce, Self-Determination for Native Americans: Land Rights and
the Utility of Domestic and International Law, 22 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L REV. 361, 387 (1991)
(arguing that the United States is unlikely ever to ratify ILO 169).
201. Laurie Sargent, The Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia's Amazon Basin Region and ILO
Convention No. 169: Real Rights or Rhetoric, 29 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 451, 487 (1998).
202. Pearce, supra note 200, at 379. Despite the weaknesses of the preceding ILO 107,
"[the United States declined to ratify ILO 107 even though it was widely approved." Id. at 387.
203. Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People, Feb. 26, 1997,
Inter-Am. C.H.R, OEA/Ser/L/1 1.95, doc. 6 1333d (1997), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/-
indigenous.htm (last visited May 26, 2003).
204. Id. at art. 11(2). "Accordingly[,] the states recognize inter alia the right of the
indigenous people to collective action, to their cultures, to profess and practice their spiritual
beliefs, and to use their languages." Id.
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Declaration extends this acknowledgement to indigenous legal practices. 205
Such a categorical deference to tribal court sovereignty would presumably
provide sufficient protection for indigenous punishments such as banish-
ment, particularly when the defendant consents to the sentence. Unfortu-
nately, there has been minimal progress by the Inter-American Commission
in adopting the Proposed Draft since its signing in February 1997.206
Another declaration currently under consideration is the United
Nations' Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 207 The
United Nations' declaration appears to be an intermediate response, com-
bining aspects of the ILO Convention and the American Declaration to an
unsatisfying result. Article 33 seems analogous to Article 8 of the ILO
Convention, stating that "indigenous peoples have the right to promote,
develop and maintain their institutional structures and their distinctive
juridical customs, traditions, procedures and practices, in accordance with
internationally recognized human rights standards." 208 Again, circum-
scribing collective indigenous rights by reference to majoritarian human
rights standards makes such acknowledgement a nullity.
Conversely, Article 12 declares quite unambiguously that "[i]ndi-
genous people have the right to practise and revitalize their cultural
traditions and customs." 209 This article provides perhaps the broadest defer-
ence to collective indigenous rights and would provide the greatest support
to banishment.210 Because the article authorizes revitalization, governments
could not challenge banishment because the punishment lay dormant on
reservations for decades. 211
Regrettably, the Human Rights Working Commission has neither
resolved this conflict nor completed deliberations on a final declaration in
205. Id. at art. XVI(2) (stating "Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and reinforce
their indigenous legal systems and also to apply them to matters within their communities,
including systems related to such matters as conflict resolution, crime prevention and maintenance
of peace and harmony"). The Proposed Declaration also acknowledges collective rights in "indi-
genous ways of life, customs, traditions, forms of social, economic and political organization,
institutions, practices, beliefs and values, use of dress, and languages." Id. at art. VII(3).
206. The fact that the Commission took eight years merely to prepare the Proposed
Declaration is disheartening as well.
207. Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N., ESCOR, Commission on
Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities,
45th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/56 (1994) [hereinafter Draft Declaration].
208. Id. at art. 33.
209. Id. at art. 12.
210. See Archer, supra note 174, at 206 (arguing that "[tihe draft Declaration... marks a
steady increase in the protection of rights for indigenous peoples").
211. Draft Declaration, supra note 207, at art. 12. In fact, this is exactly the point of the
Article. Forced assimilation deracinated indigenous populations from their cultural traditions, and
they should now be able to participate in practices proscribed by the majority culture.
2004]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
its nine years of deliberation.212 What is promising, however, is the con-
clusion to the Draft Declaration, which states emphatically that the previous
"rights constitute the minimum standards for the survival, dignity and well-
being of the indigenous peoples of the world." 2 13 The Draft Declaration
also contains a powerful mechanism for the enforcement of indigenous
group rights, granting these groups "the right to have access to and prompt
decision through mutually acceptable and fair procedures for the resolution
of conflicts ... ."214 Unfortunately, the Working Group members quite pro-
phetically realized that this stronger language would likely prevent ratifi-
cation while "the ILO's less stringent standards would give that body's
instrument a greater chance of ratification." 215
A further problem with these declarations is that, as declarations, they
are not binding on states that are parties to them.2 6 Still, there is the hope
that "group rights" declarations, once ratified, would be accepted to the
same degree as the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. Several
sources have noted that "virtually all states today have embraced" the
Declaration, resulting in customary international law. 217 Based on this uni-
versality, these sources have posited that even practices defended on the
basis of cultural relativism must be "generally consistent with the basic
thrust of the Universal Declaration." 218
The hope would be that a majority of nations would choose to comply
with these declarations and allow tribal groups to assert tribal sovereignty;
consequently, "[c]ommon practices might come to have the status of an
international customary law of indigenous rights as a greater number of na-
tions find it advantageous to their international reputations and connections
to give effect to such customs." 219
212. The Commission on Human Rights had a goal of having the draft Declaration
"approved by the General Assembly by 2004 .. ", but there is no indication this goal is close to
being realized. Archer, supra note 174, at 213. Instead, "[m]omentum for the draft Declaration
seems to be diminishing .. " Id. at 218.
213. Draft Declaration, supra note 207, at art. 42 (emphasis added).
214. Id. at art. 39.
215. Pearce, supra note 200, at 380.
216. See Archer, supra note 174, at 206 (stating "The Draft Declaration is not legally
binding, so States are not required to alter their behavior."); W. Michael Reisman, International
Law and the Inner Worlds of Others, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 25, 30 (1996) (noting "It remains to
be seen whether the words of these noble instruments will be transformed into effective practice or
will simply serve as handsome contemporary display vessels for collecting the alligator tears that
have been shed for centuries for the victims of cultural imperialisms").
217. Jack Donnelly, Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights, 6 HuM. RTS. Q. 400,
414 (1984).
218. Id at 418.
219. Rosenn, supra note 194, at 232.
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There are several reasons why nations should recognize the propriety in
preserving indigenous traditions. Under deontological theories, every
group, as a collection of individuals, has moral worth and must be respected
under a categorical imperative. 220 Under this theory, "eradication of a cul-
ture is in some sense a moral transgression in itself, wholly apart from any
effects on the culture's constituents." 221 Under Kant's Kingdom of Ends,
individuals and groups must always be treated as ends and never as
means. 222 This does not mean that a governmental body cannot use a group
as means toward its own ends; instead, it means that the body must respect
the group as an autonomous actor vested with self-direction.
This principle is violated when international bodies do not recognize
indigenous tribes, their agreements, or their group claims of human rights
violations. Properly understood, groups in indigenous culture "have an in-
trinsic moral value. . ." equal to the individual in atomized "western"
culture. 223 Granting such a group sovereignty is thus equal to granting
autonomy to the individual.
Teleological claims also support the recognition of indigenous group
rights; "[t]his argument proceeds from the belief that every culture has
instrumental or utilitarian value to the world at large." 224 Atomized western
liberalism is but one filter through which the world is experienced (and
altered). Such a unilateral world-view is limiting and stunts a broader un-
derstanding of the world. "Each culture, in its unique context, records these
experiences in ways that provide meaning, guidance and codes of rectitude
that serve as compasses for the individual as he or she navigates the
vicissitudes of life."225 To lose even one of these cultures is to lose an ...
indispensable sites for human growth, definition, and expression."
226
220. See Herz, supra note 168, at 697.
221. See id. at 697 (stating that "[tihere is moral value in communal experience, just as there
is in societal or individual experience").
222. See R. George Wright, Treating Persons as Ends in Themselves: The Legal
Implications of a Kantian Principle, 36 U. RICH. L. REv. 271, 273-283 (2002).
223. Herz, supra note 168, at 697.
224. Id.
225. Reisman, supra note 216, at 25.
226. Herz, supra note 168, at 697.
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C. CULTURAL RELATIVISM PROVIDES A VALID DEFENSE FOR
BANISHMENT
1. Introduction
Those navigating the defense of cultural relativism must address a
difficult dichotomy. On one hand, many argue that, to the extent that "hu-
man nature is relatively universal .... basic human rights must at least
initially be assumed to be similarly universal .... 227 This categorical
presumption finds some support in the fact that "[tihere is a striking simil-
arity in many of the basic values that we seek to protect through human
rights."228 Critics attack minority cultures to the extent they deviate in their
protection of these "universal" human rights. Specifically, "[c]ritics claim
Indian governments protect ways of life at variance with legal and political
values that ought to transcend racial or cultural specificity." 229
Mediating against this argument is the counter-argument rejecting the
popular assumption "that cultural relativism ... is something essentially un-
Western," "resid[ing] in (non-Western) 'traditional' communities, such as
pre-colonial African villages, Native American tribes and traditional Is-
lamic social systems." 230 The idea here is that liberalism itself is a culture.
"Aboriginal variations upon western conceptions of justice and the rule of
law cannot be criticized by nonindigenous outsiders, for external criticism
is a form of moral imperialism involving an implicit assumption that
Aboriginal forms of life are morally inferior to "civilized" society." 23'
Further, the United States' participation in international agreements is re-
plete with reservations and the failure to ratify nearly universally recog-
nized human rights conventions.
227. Donnelly, supra note 217, at 415.
228. Id. at 414.
229. Patrick Macklem, Distributing Sovereignty: Indian Nations and Equality of Peoples, 45
STAN. L. REv. 1311, 1314 (1993). With respect to these critics, the majority of their criticism is
focused on indigenous discrimination "on the basis of race or cultural difference .... deviat[ing]
from principles of equality." Id. at 1337. Admittedly, it is more difficult to defend inequality than
punishments both the society and the offender recognize as coherent with their world view.
230. Johan D. van der Vyver, American Exceptionalism: Human Rights, International
Criminal Justice, and National Self-Righteousness, 50 EMORY L. J. 775, 790-91 (2001).
231. Macklem, supra note 229, at 1314.
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2. Cultural Relativism is Particularly Applicable Here
a. Cultural Relativism is a More Valid Defense in a
Homogenous Community
A defense of cultural relativism is most difficult to raise when "the cul-
ture of a group can only be maintained at the expense of the rights of
another community, or via the agency of the state."2 32 In such cases, grant-
ing rights to one group cuts back against the rights of another group. A par-
ticularly instructive example of this process is the recent political
reorganization in Fiji. Until 1987, the island was under British rule, which
separated the Indo-Fijians and indigenous Fijians.2 33 In 1987, a military
coup led to overthrow of the government and promulgation of a new con-
stitution with reference to human rights norms that indigenous Fijians
thought "belonged to an alien political and cultural tradition."
234
Indigenous Fijians eventually convinced Indo-Fijians to establish a
commission to review the military promulgated Constitution. This commis-
sion was given the mandate of "[t]ak[ing] into account that the Constitution
shall guarantee full protection and promotion of the rights, interests and
concerns of the indigenous Fijian[s] ... "235 As a result of this mandate,
the commission created a new Constitution that many consider to "pro-
vide[] an uneasy mixture of newer international norms and a privileged
position for indigenous Fijians ...."236 As an example, the Constitution al-
lows the entirely indigenous Great Council of Chiefs effectively to have "a
veto power over constitutional and frequently, legislative changes ... ."237
Indigenous Fijians, living with Indo-Fijians and covered by a categorical
Constitution, can thus stunt political change affecting other cultures based
on their unique cultural perspective.
Conversely, indigenous American tribes seeking to justify banishment
through cultural relativism impose on the dominant culture to a much lesser
degree. This is primarily because aboriginal tribes in Canada and the
United States "live in reservations where contact with other communities is
minimal." 238 They are governed by separate legal documents, and decisions
232. Yash Ghai, Universalism and Relativism: Human Rights as a Framework for
Negotiating Interethnic Claims, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1095, 1136 (2000).
233. Id. at 1129-30.
234. Id. at 1131.
235. Id. (citing SIR PAUL REEVES, ET AL., THE FIJi ISLANDS: TOWARD A UNITED FUTURE:
REPORT OF THE FIJI CONSTITUTION REVIEW COMMISSION 754-55 (1996)).
236. Id. at 1133.
237. Id. at 1132.
238. Id. at 1137.
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on indigenous rights in these countries have no bearing on the rights of
other citizens under their national constitutions. 239 In this sense, there is no
practical conflict between the indigenous and the national culture; instead,
the "issue is purely between local values and international
standards .... " 24 0
b. Banishment is Legitimately Based on a Different
World-View by Indigenous Groups
Much of customary international law is based on "natural law"
conceptions that posit an intrinsic right to life, liberty, and property. 24' To
this degree, authoritarian regimes that either categorically deny rights to a
specific gender or race or disparately treat similarly situated individuals are
indefensible based on culture. Even Native American cultures attempting
to treat women differently from men have found their claims, that this
dichotomy is necessary to preserve their culture, rejected.242
Many members of indigenous cultures, however, would legitimately
view being banished to an undeveloped island and forced to "live off the
land" less negatively than most "westernized" citizens. This is principally
because the Anglo-Saxon "tradition views nature as God's gift to man, for
man's dominion, at the time of creation."243 For instance, "[i]n America,
this conception laid the foundation for the pioneer ideal, in which the
domination of nature is understood to be indispensable to the divinely or-
dained, linear march of progress." 244 A non-indigenous individual, accli-
mated to the consumerist majoritarian society, could well find that being
exiled into nature with none of life's luxuries was both cruel and unusual.
Unfortunately, some sources have extrapolated from this viewpoint and
superimposed their own views on to the distinct indigenous viewpoint. One
source has noted that, "[b]y branding punishment 'cruel and unusual'
simply because ... [banished offenders are] obligated to procure their own
sustenance in wilderness conditions and to provide for their own medical
239. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 51 (1978).
240. Ghai, supra note 232, at 1136.
241. Herz, supra note 168, at 694-95 (arguing that "international law theory was based upon
the prevailing view of that time: that natural law ... governed the lives of all men").
242. Id. at 708 n.133 (citing Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 36th
Sess., Supp. No. 40, Annex 18, at 166-75, U.N. Doc. A136/40 (1981); see also Martinez v. Santa
Clara Pueblo, 540 F.2d 1039 (10th Cir. 1976) (holding that a tribe could not treat the children of
female members who had married non-members differently from the children of male members
who had married non-members on the basis of maintaining the tribe's integrity). This decision
was eventually overruled by the Supreme Court, which found that complaints under the Indian
Civil Rights Act must be heard in tribal courts and not the federal courts.




care, several commentators betrayed a lack of understanding of and ap-
preciation for the Tlingit relationship to the natural environment . ."245
Instead of having the impulse to dominate nature, "to the extent one can
generalize, Native American cosmology is based on the sacred primacy of
the natural world-of which man is merely a constituent. ... 246
It is instructive here to consider socialization's effect on the indi-
vidual's view of punishment. A cross-cultural study between Japan and the
United States found that "[t]he Japanese view of punishment appears very
different" from the American perspective. 47 Whereas offenders are rou-
tinely incarcerated in the United States, there is a general "Japanese reluc-
tance to incarcerate offenders" based on the belief that being isolated from
others is a severe (and perhaps cruel) punishment. 248 This is consistent with
the Japanese "network view of individuals" but conflicts with the atomized
American view of individuals. 249
It seems fair to extrapolate from this and other studies a general theory
that a culture will perceive a punishment as more severe the more removed
that punishment is from the culture's everyday experience. This theory is
essential to an understanding of why banishment would not be seen as cruel
or inhuman under many indigenous cultures.
As much as one can generalize, the foundation of Native American
culture is subsistence. 250 Although difficult to define, subsistence essen-
tially coheres with the above-identified indigenous world-view. It reflects
the close relation between indigenous groups and both the natural and
spiritual world.251 Subsistence is a culture "passed from generation to gen-
eration intact, through the repetition of legends and observance of cere-
monials which were largely concerned with the use of land, water, and the
resources contained therein." 252
Although not so limited, subsistence is a communal activity that teach-
es successive generations how to "live off the land" through the teaching of:
[c]ountless tasks, such as the maintenance of equipment....
preparing the outfit for major hunting and fishing expeditions,
setting and checking traplines, dressing and packing hundreds of
245. Bradford, supra note 1, at n.221.
246. Herz, supra note 168, at 693 (emphasis added).
247. V. Lee Hamilton, et al., Punishment and the Individual in the United States and Japan,
22 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 301, 304 (1988).
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Mary Kancewick & Eric Smith, Subsistence in Alaska: Towards A Native Priority, 59
UMKC L. REv. 645, 649-50 (1991).
251. Id.
252. Id. at 650.
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pounds of meat, cutting and drying thousands of pounds of fish,
gathering berries and edible plants, tanning skins and hides, mak-
ing things from them-clothing, footgear, containers, sleds, tents,
kayaks .... 253
In this manner, then, not only is banishment consistent with the
underpinnings of many indigenous cultures, but it is also designed for the
offender to re-connect with his ancestors and nature. It is only at this point
that we can see the true necessity of indigenous groups retaining this alter-
native sentencing practice. Being exposed to westernized jails only further
separates the offender from his tribe. A sentence such as banishment allows
the offender to reconnect with his roots and re-integrate into his tribe.
In the same sense that the Marxist says the capitalist can never truly
understand communism, the non-native can never truly appreciate the indi-
genous connection with the land. Centuries of repetition have "intricately
woven [subsistence] into the fabric of [indigenous] social, psychological
and religious life."254 The non-native simply cannot critically conceptualize
this way of living through a priori reasoning because he "does not have a
thousands of years old subsistence relationship with the lands .... "255 For
the native, this relationship with the land is part of who he is as a person,
and, more importantly, as a member of his tribal community; "[f]or the non-
Native, the activities of hunting and fishing and gathering are not tribal
community activities, shaping tribal relationships, celebrations, history, for
generations back into time immemorial." 256
IV. CONCLUSION
Banishment reflects one of many attempts by indigenous tribes to
reclaim sovereignty and preserve their existence. Considered under current
"universal" human rights documents, banishment would likely be con-
sidered as cruel and inhumane. Such a narrow perspective, however, would
deny what is unique both about the punishment and indigenous tribes
themselves. Understood under indigenous subsistence, banishment is not a
severe punishment for tribal offenders who have necessarily consented to
the sentencing circle imposing it. Hopefully, through ratification and
incorporation of the draft declarations on indigenous group rights,
customary international law will develop, recognizing the right of tribes to
engage in alternative sentencing.
253. Id. at 651.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 651.
256. Id. at 652.
[VOL. 80:253
